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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)Q). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
None. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
The following material facts are undisputed: 
1. Mr. Anderson began employment with the Larry H. Miller 
Communications Corporation (the "Company") in November of 2007 as one of 
three anchors of a morning television show called "KJZZ Cafe" to be broadcast on 
the Company's KJZZ television station. R. 86-88. 
2. At the time he was hired, Mr. Anderson was a full-time school teacher 
in the Davis County School District. R. 91-93. 
3. Mr. Anderson is highly educated, with a Masters Degree in English. 
R. 109. 
4. In approximately the summer/fall of 2007, Dean Paynter, the 
Company's Director of News and Program Development at the time, invited 
Mr. Anderson to audition for one of the three co-anchor positions for the new 
morning show. R. 85-92. 
1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5. After the auditions, Mr. Paynter recommended to his supervisor, 
Chris Baum, that Mr. Anderson as well as Andy Waits and Tracy Woolley be hired 
as the three anchors for the new show. R. 87-92. 
6. Chris Baum was the General Manager of the Company during the 
time Mr. Anderson was employed. R. 178 (p. 18: 15-19). 
7. Mr. Paynter did not have the authority to hire Mr. Anderson or the 
other two anchors. Mr. Anderson was aware of this, and knew that someone other 
than Mr. Paynter would make the hiring decision. R. 87-89, 91-92. 
8. Mr. Anderson began working for the Company on November 26, 
2007. R. 3,119. 
9. On November 28, 2007, Mr. Anderson signed a number of personnel 
documents, including an Employment Application, Employee Handbook and 
Employment At-Will Acknowledgement. R. 96-102. ( 
10. The Application Mr. Anderson signed states as follows, in all capital 
letters, directly above the signature line: 
I 
IF EMPLOYED, I UNDERSTAND AND AGREE THAT MY 
EMPLOYMENT IS "AT-WILL" AND MAY BE TERMINATED 
WITH OR WITHOUT CAUSE OR NOTICE, AT MY OPTION OR 
THE OPTION OF THE EMPLOYER. 
4 
R. 97-98; Application at R. 117-118. 
11. That same day, Mr. Anderson signed another document 
i 
acknowledging that he received, read and understood the Company's Employee 
2 
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Handbook, and that he understood that he was an employee at-will, and as such 
had no guaranteed period of employment. R. 100-102; Acknowledgement of 
Employee Handbook and "AT-WILL" Employment, R. 120 (Ex. 1 to Appellee's 
Addendum attached hereto). 
12. The Acknowledgement states, in part, as follows: 
I understand that my employment is "at-will." I understand that I may 
quit for any reason or no reason at all and that my employment may 
be terminated at any time with or without cause or notice. 
R. 100-102, 120 (Ex. 1 to Appellee's Addendum attached hereto). 
13. The Acknowledgement also states as follows: 
I also understand and agree that no person other than Larry H. Miller 
has the authority to enter into any binding commitment or agreement 
to or with me, on behalf of the Company, and that any such 
commitment or agreement must be in writing and signed by all 
parties. 
R. 101-102, 120 (Ex. 1 to Appellee's Addendum attached hereto (emphasis 
added)). 
14. The Employee Handbook Mr. Anderson acknowledged that he 
received and understood has a provision which states as follows: 
This handbook is not intended to create any contractual obligation 
between the Larry H. Miller Group of Companies and its employees. 
The Larry H. Miller Group of Companies is an "at-will" employer. 
Employees may quit for any reason or no reason at all, or they may be 
terminated by the company at any time with or without cause or 
notice. 
3 
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R. 105-106, 123. 
15. Mr. Anderson signed yet another confirmation of his at-will status two 
days later, on November 30, 2007. R. 99-100; Acknowledgement of Drug Testing 
Policy, R. 125, which states, in part, as follows: 
I further acknowledge that I am an "at-will" employee of the Group, 
and that nothing in the Drug Testing Policy alters the Group's right to 
terminate me at-will, with or without cause. 
16. Mr. Anderson had no written signed employment agreement at the 
time he signed the at-will and commitment disclaimer documents. R. 95, 98-99. 
17. On December 26, 2007, Mr. Paynter requested the Company's legal 
department to provide him with a draft employment agreement that he could 
distribute to the three anchors for discussion purposes. R. 129-130, 134-135. 
18. On January 3, 2008, the Company's legal department provided ) 
Mr. Paynter with the requested draft of a potential employment agreement. 
R. 128-130. 
I 
19. Mr. Paynter distributed the draft to all three anchors on or about 
January 4, 2008. R. 128-129. A copy of the draft provided to Mr. Anderson is 
Appellee's Exhibit 2 to the Appellee's Addendum attached hereto, and in the 
record at R. 137-144. 
\ 
4 
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20. The draft contained a number of blanks, including a number of blanks 
in the paragraph defining the term of the agreement, and the dates by which the 
Company could choose to renew or reject the contract on an annual basis. R. 137-
144 (Ex. 2 to Appellee's Addendum, ffl[ 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2, and 4.1). 
21. Paragraph 2.1 of the draft agreement also contained a parenthetical 
question for ongoing discussion purposes which states as follows: 
[IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE WE OUGHT TO SPECIFY?] 
R. 137 (Ex. 2 to Appellee's Addendum, ^ 2.1). 
22. The draft employment agreement was never signed by Mr. Anderson, 
Larry Miller, or anyone else. R. 95, 98-99. 
23. At no time did Mr. Anderson or Larry Miller, or anyone else, sign any 
document guaranteeing Mr. Anderson three years of employment, or salary in the 
event he was discharged prior to the end of the alleged three year term. R. 95, 98-
99. 
24. Mr. Anderson claims that when he received the draft employment 
agreement from Dean Paynter, Mr. Paynter told him that the agreement did not 
need to be signed to be valid. R. 109-1 ll .1 
1
 Mr. Paynter strongly denies making any such statement or that he made any 
contractual commitments to Mr. Anderson. Mr. Anderson's assertions to the 
contrary are accepted as true for purposes of summary judgment only. 
5 
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25. The first KJZZ Cafe show aired on January 21, 2008; the following 
day, the show received very negative reviews. R. 103-104. 
26. The show continued to receive bad reviews and low ratings and was 
therefore cancelled approximately 10 months later, in November 2008. R. 84, 103, 
107-108, 131-132. 
27. As a result of the show's cancellation, Mr. Anderson and about 30 of 
the Company's other employees associated with the show were laid off. R. 131-
133. 
28. At no time did Mr. Anderson quit his teaching job with the Davis 
County School District. In fact, while employed by the Company, he continued to 
teach full-time until some time in January 2008, and then only reduced his hours 
by one-third thereafter. R. 84, 94, 106, 112-113. 
29. Mr. Anderson resumed full-time teaching in August 2009, and has { 
worked full-time teaching for the Davis County School District since then. R. 77-
78,80. 
i 
RESPONSE TO MR, ANDERSON'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As shown below, the assertions made in paragraphs 11, 27 and 30 of 
Mr. Anderson's Statement of Facts are incorrect, not supported by the cited 
testimony, and in some cases contradicts the cited testimony. These paragraphs are 
restated below, followed by Defendant's responses to each: ^ 
6 
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11. Mr. Paynter selected Mr. Anderson and two others to become the 
anchors for KJZZ Cafe. R. 87-88. 
Response: This statement is misleading and inaccurate, because it leaves 
out the fact that Mr. Anderson knew that Mr. Paynter had no authority to hire him 
or the other anchors and that others would be making the decision: 
A. (Mr. Anderson) Well, for Dean it was already decided that we were 
the three, but he was trying to convince other people. 
Q. (Ms. Smith) Right. But you knew that Dean didn't have the final 
decision as to who the three would be, isn't that correct? 
A. (Mr. Anderson) Yes. 
Q. (Ms. Smith) So you knew that even though Dean Paynter wanted 
the three of you, that someone else would be making the final 
decision? 
A. (Mr. Anderson) Yes. 
R.91. 
27. On or about January 4, 2008, Mr. Paynter presented Mr. Anderson 
with the Employment Agreement at issue in this case, which contained a salary 
guarantee for three years. R. 183-184; Employment Agreement at R. 137-144. 
Mr. Paynter acknowledges that he gave Mr. Anderson a contract that represented 
what LHMCC was prepared to offer him. R. 192. When Mr. Anderson did not get 
back to him with any changes, he understood that Mr. Anderson did not have any 
major objections to the contract. 
7 
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Response: Contrary to Mr. Anderson's assertion, the draft employment 
agreement does not contain a salary guarantee for three years. In fact, the term of 
the Agreement is left blank. R. 138 (Ex. 2 to Appellee's Addendum, ]f 3). 
The assertion that "Mr. Paynter acknowledges that he gave Mr. Anderson a 
contract that represented what LHMCC was prepared to offer him" is contradicted 
by the testimony Mr. Anderson cites in support of this assertion. In fact, Mr. 
Paynter testified that the agreement was only "a draft for them to see what the 
company had initially offered" and that: 
We would have scrutinized it further before — it seems to me we 
would have scrutinized it further before putting it in concrete. 
R. 192 (p. 108: 14-16). 
Mr. Paynter further testified that a critical term was missing as evidenced by 
the blank lines in the draft, which would have been filled in had the draft been 
"scrutinized further." 
And, in fact, would have picked up on something that was — had 
been missing, and that is the one year out for both sides, after each 
year, which was not included in the draft. Which both Chris and I 
discussed. 
Q. (Ms. Hollingsworth) What do you mean "one year out?" 
A. (Mr. Paynter) As I discussed, after one year, both sides would have 
the chance to opt-out, with some notice. 
Q. (Ms. Hollingsworth) And that was missing from the contract? 
A. (Mr. Paynter) Yes. 
8 
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R. 192-93 (pp. 108: 17-25; 109: 1-2). 
The assertion that "when Mr. Anderson did not get back to him with any 
changes, [Mr. Paynter] understood that Mr. Anderson did not have any major 
objections to the contract" is misleading, because it leaves out Mr. Paynter's 
testimony that: 
I expect — I expected them to look at it, and give me any feedback on 
the draft before we would have put it in - in concrete. 
R. 192 (p. 106: 15-17). 
This was a draft. It was very clear in my mind this was a draft. My — 
my extension to these three people was this is a draft. Take a look at 
it. Get feedback for it before we put the draft into a final form. 
R. 134. 
30. Mr. Paynter claims that the Employment Agreement was only a draft, 
but as stated above, he does not dispute that the terms in it represented his 
Agreement with Mr. Anderson. He claims that the reason it was never finalized 
was due to the fact that the parties were busy: my recollection is that we were in 
the heat of battle . . . we were moving forward on the show . . . we were more 
worried about what we were doing on the air then where the contracts were." 
R. 134-135. 
Response: Mr. Paynter never testified "that the terms in [the draft 
employment agreement] represented his agreement with Mr. Anderson." In fact, 
9 
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as shown in the above quoted testimony, Mr. Paynter expressly denied that he had 
any agreement with Mr. Anderson. Mr. Paynter testified that the Employment 
Agreement given to the anchors was only a draft with terms left to be negotiated 
and filled in and never became a final agreement. R. 134-135, 192-193 (pp. 106-
109). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Anderson's claims are based upon his assertion that he had a guaranteed 
contract of employment with the Company for three years, and that he is entitled to 
be paid his salary for the two years he claims was remaining on his contract after 
he was let go pursuant to a reduction in force. This Court should affirm the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment dismissing all of Mr. Anderson's claims for the 
following reasons: 
Mr. Anderson's claim for breach of contract fails as a matter of law because ( 
it is undisputed that 1) the person he claims committed to the alleged contract on 
behalf of the Company, Dean Paynter, had no authority to do so; 2) the only person 
who had the authority to bind the Company to any such commitment or agreement 
was Larry Miller, and Mr. Miller never made any promises or representations to 
I 
Mr. Anderson; 3) any such commitment or agreement by Mr. Miller could only 
legally bind the Company if it were in a writing signed by all parties, and there is 
i 
10 
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no such writing; and 4) the unsigned draft agreement Mr. Anderson seeks to 
enforce is not complete and too indefinite to constitute a contract. 
Mr. Anderson's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing fails as a matter of law because the covenant only applies to existing, 
established contract terms, does not create new independent rights not agreed upon 
by the parties, and the undisputed facts established that the contract Mr. Anderson 
alleges never existed. 
Mr. Anderson's claims for promissory estoppel and fraud fail as a matter of 
law because 1) the Company as an entity never made any promise or other 
representation to Mr. Anderson; and 2) since he knew that Dean Paynter had no 
authority to bind the Company, and that nothing but a writing signed by all parties 
was enforceable, Mr. Anderson did not reasonably rely on any verbal 
representations made by Dean Paynter. 
ARGUMENT 
I. MR. ANDERSON'S CLAIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT FAILS 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A. Dean Paynter Did Not Have the Authority to Bind the Company 
to the Contract Mr. Anderson Seeks to Enforce. 
Mr. Anderson's claim that Dean Paynter guaranteed his salary for three 
years fails because the undisputed facts establish that Mr. Paynter had neither 
actual nor apparent authority to bind the Company to any such promise. 
11 
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1. Dean Paynter Did Not Have Actual Authority to Bind the 
Company. 
Mr. Anderson expressly agreed at the beginning of his employment in 
November 2007, that "no person other than Larry H. Miller has the authority to 
enter into any binding commitment or agreement to or with me, on behalf of the 
Company, and that any such commitment or agreement must be in writing and 
signed by all parties." Mr. Anderson's express acknowledgement and agreement 
that only Larry H. Miller could contractually bind the Company to any 
commitment or agreement bars Mr. Anderson's contractual claim as a matter of ' 
law. See, e ^ Rolsen V. Lazarus, Inc., 2000 WL 1434170* 4-5 (Ohio App. 1 
Dist, Sept. 29, 2000) (where company informed employee that only the Senior 
Vice President of Human Resources had the authority to bind the company to an 
employment agreement and that any such agreement had to be in writing and 
signed by that person, employee's contract claim based on verbal representations 
by another employee failed as a matter of law) (attached hereto as Ex. 3 to 
Appellee's Addendum); Waterman v. Greektown Casino, 2004 WL 787157 *2 1 
(Mich. App. April 13, 2004) (same) (attached hereto as Ex. 4 to Appellee's 
Addendum); Kaplan v. Capital Company of America, LLC, 298 A.D. 2d 110, 111 
(App. Div. N.Y.) (plaintiffs breach of contract claim failed as a matter of law, 
because given the contractual disclaimer, the company officers who made the 
i 
alleged contractual promises to plaintiff had no actual or apparent authority to bind 
12 
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the company), Tomlinson v. Qualcomm, Inc., 118 Cal Rptr. 2d 822, 831 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2002) ("Here, the parties agreed to both the at-will relationship and to the 
exclusive method for amending the at-will nature of [plaintiffs] employment, and 
therefore no other purported amendments (whether in written or oral form) are 
effective.59)-2 
Mr. Anderson's assertion that the Court may consider extrinsic evidence of 
intent beyond the clear and unambiguous language of a signed agreement is 
incorrect. Utah law is clear that extrinsic evidence may not be considered to 
determine the intent of the parties if the language of the agreement is 
unambiguous. Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, LLC, 207 P.3d 1235 
(Utah 2009): 
Where the language within the four corners of the contract is 
unambiguous, the party's intentions are determined from the plain 
meaning of the contractual language and the contract may be 
interpreted as a matter of law. Only if the language of the contract is 
ambiguous will we consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent. 
Cafe Rio at 1240. See also, Daines v. Vincent, 190 P.3d 1269 (Utah 2008).3 
There is no support for Mr. Anderson's assertion that the draft employment 
agreement he was provided in January 2008 "superseded" the Acknowledgment he 
signed. 
3
 The Utah Court of Appeals case of Gillmor v. Macev, 2005 UT App. 351 (Utah 
App. 2005) relied upon by Mr. Anderson in support of his claim that extrinsic 
evidence should be considered in this matter pre-dated Daines. The Utah Supreme 
Court's holdings in Daines and the subsequent Cafe Rio case is the law, not 
Gillmor. 
13 
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The Utah Supreme Court has held that "before permitting recourse to parol 
evidence a court must make a determination of facial ambiguity." Daines at 1276. 
Facial ambiguity does not exist unless the plaintiff first offers a reasonable 
competing interpretation of the language at issue. Id. Further, "[a] finding of 
ambiguity [is justified] only if the competing interpretations are reasonably 
supported by the language of the contract." Moss v. Parr Waddoups, 197 P.3d 659, 
663 (Utah App. 2008). "There can be no ambiguity where evidence is offered to 
obscure otherwise plain contractual terms" and the Supreme Court does "not intend 
i 
that a judge allow surrounding circumstances to create ambiguity where the 
language of a contract would otherwise not permit." Daines at 1277. Absent a 
finding of facial ambiguity, "the parties intentions must be determined solely from 
the language of the contract." Daines at 1279. 
Mr. Anderson's assertion that an ambiguity was created by the Company's
 { 
Employee Handbook because it states that the General Manager (Chris Baum) 
could bind the Company to agreements concerning employment is unavailing 
1 
because 1) this is an impermissible attempt to use extrinsic evidence to obscure the 
unambiguous language of the Acknowledgement he signed, and to which he 
expressly agreed; 2) Mr. Anderson admits that Mr. Baum did not enter into any 
agreement with him and this language does not create any issue of fact concerning 
whether Mr. Paynter had any such authority; 3) the Acknowledgment I 
14 
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Mr. Anderson signed states that the handbook is not a contract, not legally binding, 
and the Company retained the right "to depart from those policies and guidelines or 
change them at its sole discretion;" and 4) the handbook provision has the same 
signed writing requirement as the Acknowledgement Mr. Anderson signed, which 
Mr. Anderson admits was not met. 
There is no ambiguity in the express statement Mr. Anderson signed, and 
Mr. Anderson does not offer any alternative or "competing" interpretation of the 
meaning of the Acknowledgement which would in any way support his assertion 
that Dean Paynter had the authority to bind the Company to the commitment he 
asserts in this action. For this reason, the Court should enforce the 
Acknowledgement's clear and unequivocal language to which Mr. Anderson 
expressly agreed. 
2. Dean Paynter Did Not Have Apparent Authority to Bind 
the Company. 
Mr. Anderson asserts that apparent authority of an agent to bind its principal 
exists "where a person has created such an appearance of things that it causes a 
third party reasonably and prudently to believe that a second party has the power to 
act on behalf of the first person." However, it is undisputed that the Company 
expressly informed Mr. Anderson that only Mr. Miller had the authority to bind the 
Company to an employment contract, thereby making it clear that Mr. Paynter had 
no authority to do so, apparent or otherwise. 
15 
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Contrary to Mr. Anderson's assertion, the case of Shattuck-Owen v. 
Snowbird Corporation, 16 P.3d 555, 560 (Utah 2000) does not stand for the 
proposition that a representative who holds himself out as someone who can bind 
the Company, has the authority to do so despite a written statement to the contrary. 
In Shattuck-Owen, the court noted that the contract disclaimer in the employee 
handbook at issue there was limited, because it stated only that no one but the CEO 
had the authority to "alter the at-will relationship." (Emphasis added.) Unlike 
here, that disclaimer contained no disclaimer of general contractual liability. The 
Shattuck-Owen court simply held that any promise made by the V.P. of Human 
Resources to reimburse an employee for the cost of therapy with her doctor could 
be enforced, because the handbook disclaimer did not apply to that type of 
promise: 
On its face, the statement simply provides that the CEO/Chairman is < 
the only person who can modify the at-will employment status of the 
signee, and that the modification must be in writing. In the instant 
case, Shattuck-Owen's alleged contract does not deal with her at-will 
employment status. As such, the signed statement appears to have no 
application to the instant case, at least in light of the facts currently on ' 
the record. 
Shattuck-Owen at 560. 
Here, the contract disclaimer is not limited, as was the contract disclaimer in * 
Shattuck-Owen. Unlike the Shattuck-Owen disclaimer, this disclaimer expressly 
states that no one other than Larry H. Miller had the authority to bind the Company 
16 
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to any agreement or other commitment, and then only in a writing signed by all 
parties. Because these clear, unambiguous conditions were not met, summary 
judgment should be affirmed. 
It is undisputed given the clear contractual disclaimer to which 
Mr. Anderson expressly agreed that Dean Paynter had no authority to bind the 
Company to a three year guaranteed employment contract with Mr. Anderson, or 
make any other binding commitment on behalf of the Company, and that 
Mr. Anderson knew this to be true. It is further undisputed that Larry Miller never 
entered into any such contract with Mr. Anderson or otherwise made any 
representations or promises to Mr. Anderson.4 Therefore, any alleged "promises" 
or "representations" made by Mr. Paynter concerning a guaranteed three year 
contract or any other alleged commitments are not binding on the Company and 
are unenforceable. 
B. There Was no Contract as a Matter of Law Because the Company 
Clearly Intended That There Would be no Contract Unless in 
Writing and Signed by All Parties. 
Utah law states that "if the parties make it clear that they do not intend that 
there should be legal consequences unless and until a formal writing is executed, 
there is no contract until that time." Engineering Assoc, v. Irving Place Assoc, 
622 P.2d 784, 787 (Utah 1980); see also RJ. Daum Constr. Co. v. Child, 247 P.2d 
4
 It is also undisputed that Mr. Anderson never talked to the General Manager, 
Chris Baum, about his alleged contract. R. 113-114. 
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817, 820 (Utah 1952) (explaining that "if an intention is manifested in any way that 
legal obligations between the parties shall be deferred until the writing is made, the 
preliminary negotiations and agreements do not constitute a contract."); Precision 
Time, Inc. v. Equity Properties and Development Limited Partnership, 2001 WL 
1297792 (Utah App. October 25, 2001) (a tentative agreement on a number of 
relevant terms is unenforceable and does not constitute a binding contract where 
one of the parties expressed its intent not be bound other than by a finalized, signed 
contract) (attached hereto as Ex. 5 to Appellee's Addendum). 
Mr. Anderson's assertion that Mr. Paynter told him that the draft agreement 
did not need to be signed is irrelevant, because, as established above, only Larry 
Miller had the authority to commit the Company to any modification of the express 
signature requirement Mr. Anderson agreed to when he began employment. 
Furthermore, given the express disclaimer language Mr. Anderson signed, any < 
such modification of the signature requirement had to be in writing and signed by 
all parties as well. 
I 
Because it is undisputed that 1) the Company intended not to be bound to 
any commitment or agreement other than a written contract signed by all parties, 
and 2) no such signed contract exists, Mr. Anderson's claim for breach of contract 
for a guaranteed three year term of employment and three years of salary fails as a 
matter of law. I 
18 
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C. The Draft Agreement Mr. Anderson Seeks to Enforce is 
Unenforceable Because it is Incomplete and Indefinite. 
The draft employment agreement Mr. Anderson seeks to enforce is not a 
complete agreement, but contains a number of blanks leaving essential terms to be 
filled in which were never finalized, including the term of the agreement. See 
Draft Employment Agreement (Ex. 2 to Appellee's Addendum, R. 137-144). The 
agreement also contains comments in a parenthetical phrase which further 
establishes that it was a draft only for discussion purposes and was not finalized. 
See Draft Employment Agreement (Ex. 2 to Appellee's Addendum, R. 137-144, 
112.1). 
Under Utah law "It is fundamental that a meeting of the minds on the 
integral features of an agreement is essential to the formation of a contract. An 
agreement cannot be enforced if its terms are indefinite." Nielsen v. Golds Gym, 
78 P.3d 600, 602 (Utah 2003), quoting Richard Barton Enters, v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 
368, 373 (Utah 1996); see also Candland v. Oldroyd, 248 P. 1101, 1102 (Utah 
1926) ("So long as there is any uncertainty or indefmiteness, or future negotiations 
or considerations to be had between the parties, there is not a completed contract. 
In fact, there is no contract at all.") 
Essential terms were missing from the draft agreement, and as Mr. Paynter 
testified, the Company never meant for it to be the final agreement, but only 
something to be discussed and perhaps agreed to later. See R. 134-135, 234-235. 
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As such, it is not enforceable. See, e.g., Harmon v. Greenwood, 596 P.2d 636, 639 
(Utah 1979) ("such agreements to agree are generally unenforceable because they 
leave open material terms for future consideration, and the courts cannot create 
these terms for the parties"). Further, Mr. Anderson ignores the settled Utah law 
discussed above which holds that if a party expresses its intent not to be bound 
except by a signed writing, there is no contract until that is accomplished. 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Anderson's First Cause of Action for Breach 
of Contract fails as a matter of law and the grant of summary judgment dismissing 
this claim should be affirmed. 
II. MR. ANDERSON'S SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE COMPANY FAILS AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
Mr. Anderson's claim that the Company should be estopped from denying 
that he had a guaranteed contract for three years fails because 1) given the contract \ 
disclaimer he signed, the Company could not be bound by any representation of a 
three year employment contract or guaranteed salary by Mr. Paynter, and 
i 
2) Mr. Anderson could not have reasonably relied upon any representation to this 
effect made by Mr. Paynter. 
In order to establish a claim for promissory estoppel, Mr. Anderson must 
establish each of the following elements: 
i 
20 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1. He acted with prudence and in reasonable reliance on a promise made 
by the Company. 
2. The Company knew that Mr. Anderson had relied on the promise 
which it reasonably expected would induce action or forbearance on the part of 
Mr. Anderson; 
3. The Company was aware of all material facts; and 
4. Mr. Anderson relied on the Company's promise and the reliance 
resulted in a loss to Mr. Anderson. 
See Nunley v. Westates Casing Services, Inc., 989 P.2d 1077, 1088 (Utah 1999). 
Mr. Anderson's assertion that Utah case law is clear 'that a determination 
regarding reasonable reliance is not appropriate for summary judgment" is 
incorrect. The Utah Supreme Court has held that "while the question of reasonable 
reliance is usually a matter within the province of a jury, there are instances where 
courts may conclude that as a matter of law, there was no reasonable reliance." 
Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1067, Utah 1996 (citations 
omitted). One such instance is where, as here, the plaintiff argues that he 
reasonably relied upon oral statements in light of contrary written information. 
Gold Standard at 1068. In fact, Gold Standard held that under well-settled Utah 
law, "a party cannot reasonably rely upon oral statements by the opposing party in 
light of contrary written information." Id. 
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Mr. Anderson was well aware that Mr. Paynter had no authority to bind the 
Company to a promise of a guaranteed salary for three years, and that no such 
promise was enforceable or binding upon the Company unless it was made in a 
writing signed by both him and Larry Miller. See, e.g., Rolsen, supra, *6, where in 
addressing the same sort of contract disclaimer at issue here, the Court held as 
follows: 
The fallacy of [plaintiff s promissory estoppel] argument is 
several-fold. First, according to the express terms of her 
employment, only the Senior Vice President in charge of Human 
Resources could alter the terms of Rolsen's at-will employment. 
In fact, the express terms specifically stated that a manager-level 
employee did not have the authority to enter into a contract for 
extended employment. Thus, even if we assume that Meier had 
made a promise of continued employment, Rolsen's reliance upon 
it would not have been reasonable, since she was expected to have 
read and understood the language in her employment application. 
See also Honorable v. American Wyott Corp., 11 P.3d 928, 931 (Wyo. 2000) 
(promissory estoppel claim failed as a matter of law where employee's contract 
disclaimer stated that no supervisor or manager has the authority to bind the 
company to any employment contract, and that any employment contract had to be | 
in writing and signed by one of the named individuals.). 
Because the Company as an entity never made any promise of guaranteed 
< 
employment to Mr. Anderson and because he knew that Mr. Paynter had no 
authority to make any such promise on behalf of the Company and therefore did 
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not reasonably rely upon any such promise, the grant of summary judgment 
dismissing Mr. Anderson's claim for promissory estoppel should be affirmed. 
III. MR. ANDERSON'S THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD 
AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Mr. Anderson's claim for fraud against the Company and Mr. Paynter5 also 
fails because 1) the Company as an entity never made any of the alleged 
representations to Mr. Anderson; and 2) Mr. Anderson did not reasonably rely 
upon the alleged verbal representations by Mr. Paynter. 
In order to establish a claim of fraud under Utah law, Mr. Anderson must 
prove each of the following elements: 
1) a representation was made; 2) concerning a presently existing 
material fact; 3) which was false; and 4) which the representor a) 
knew to be false or b) made recklessly knowing that there was 
insufficient knowledge upon which to base such a representation; 5) 
for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it and 6) the 
other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; 7) did in 
fact rely upon it; 8) and was thereby induced to act 9) to that party's 
injury and damage. 
See Gold Standard at 1066-67. 
As discussed above, Mr. Anderson could not have reasonably relied upon 
Paynter5 s alleged verbal promise of a three year guaranteed contract or three years 
guaranteed salary, in light of the clear agreement he signed which provided that he 
5
 Mr. Anderson acknowledges that he has no estoppel or fraud claim against Chris 
Baum, inasmuch as he testified that he never talked to Mr. Baum about his alleged 
contract. R. 113-114. 
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was an employee at-will, and that the only person who had the authority to modify 
the at-will status or make any other binding commitments or agreements on behalf 
of the Company was Larry Miller, and that the only way any agreement would be 
binding was if it was in writing, signed by both parties. In light of Mr. Anderson's 
signed acknowledgement and express agreement to these terms, he could not, and 
did not, reasonably rely upon the alleged verbal representations of Mr. Paynter. 
Mr. Anderson also did not reasonably rely upon Mr. Paynter's alleged 
representation that the draft agreement he received did not need to be signed to be 
valid, in light of the clear contractual disclaimer he signed which provided that 
only Larry Miller could make binding commitments on behalf of the Company, 
i 
and only then in a signed writing, which includes any modification of the express 
signature requirement. 
Finally, Mr. Anderson's claim for fraud against the Company also fails | 
because the Company as an entity never made any such representation to 
Mr. Anderson. Only Larry Miller had the authority to commit the Company, and 
Mr. Anderson knew this. 
For these reasons, the grant of summary judgment dismissing 
Mr. Anderson's claims for fraud should be affirmed. 
I 
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IV. MR. ANDERSON'S FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH 
OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR 
DEALING FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Mr. Anderson's alleged claims for breach of implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing against Defendants for "making promises to Mr. Anderson 
regarding a salary guarantee for three years that they did not intend to be bound 
by" fails because there was no such contract in the first place. 
Utah law is clear that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
only applies to established, existing contract terms, and cannot create "new, 
independent rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties." Brehany v. 
Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991). 
In order for the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to apply, 
there must be a contract term which creates an obligation on the part of the obligor, 
which in turn contains an implied covenant that the obligor will act in good faith in 
meeting its contractual obligation. There is no implied covenant of good faith 
which applies to a generic "employment relationship" with no reference to any 
specific contractual obligation on the part of the employer and Mr. Anderson has 
cited no authority which supports this assertion. 
Here, the only contractual obligation Mr. Anderson asserts is the alleged 
obligation to pay him two years of salary, which is the amount of time he claims 
remained on his "Term" of the alleged employment agreement after his discharge. 
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Because there was no such contract, there is no such obligation which the 
Company was required to carryout in good faith. Brehanv at 55. 
V. THE LACK OF A HEARING ON THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT DOES NOT WARRANT REVERSAL. 
As Mr. Anderson acknowledges, failure to hold a hearing after a party 
requests it does not compel reversal of the trial court's substantive ruling unless it 
is prejudicial.6 
In the case relied upon by Mr. Anderson, Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251 
(Utah 1997), the Utah Supreme Court refused to reverse the trial court's 
substantive ruling based upon its failure to hold a hearing. In doing so, the court 
held: 
For such error to compel reversal of the trial court's substantive 
ruling, however, it must have been prejudicial. If the error was 
harmless, that is, if the error was sufficiently inconsequential that 
there is no reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome of the 
case, then a reversal is not in order. 
Price at 1255 (citations omitted). 
The Price court went on to hold that the plaintiff had failed to show 
prejudice sufficient to warrant reversal because: 
Further, Appellees do not concede that the trial court erred in not scheduling or 
holding a hearing. A court is not required to grant a request for a hearing if it finds 
that the relevant issues have been authoritatively decided. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
7(e). The Minute Entry issued by the court granting summary judgment indicates 
that it believed the issues to have been authoritatively decided by "clear" contract ( 
law. R. 239-242. 
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He has not shown that he would have made new or additional 
arguments at the hearing that were not covered by his memorandum 
of points and authorities. Indeed, on appeal to this court the 
arguments made by Price in his appellate brief and during oral 
argument are the same arguments that he made in his memorandum 
before the trial court. 
IcL See also West v. Case, 142 P.3d 576, 580 (Ut. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the 
trial court's failure to hold a hearing was harmless error because the defendant did 
not identify any reason to believe that oral argument would have altered the trial 
court's ruling.). 
Mr. Anderson does not claim to have been deprived the opportunity to make 
new arguments which had a reasonable likelihood of altering the trial court's 
ruling. Instead, he claims only that he "could have pointed out the factual issues 
and legal precedent that the court was overlooking in analyzing the case as set 
forth herein." However, there is no evidence that the court "overlooked" anything, 
and Mr. Anderson's arguments and legal precedent contained in his brief before 
this Court are the same arguments and legal precedent contained in his 
memorandum to the trial court. 
Because Mr. Anderson has failed to establish that he had any new arguments 
which if made at the hearing had a reasonable likelihood of altering the outcome of 
the case, any error in not holding a hearing was harmless and reversal is not 
warranted. Price at 1255; West at 580. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the decision of the trial 
court granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing 
Plaintiffs entire action, with prejudice. 
DATED this 19th day of July, 2011. 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
Janet Hugie Smith 
Michael E. Blue 
Attorneys for Appellees Larry H. Miller 
Communications Corporation, Dean 
Paynter and Chris Baum 
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12/11/2007 11:23 801-238-5421 
KJZZ VJ ACCTG PAGE 89/15 
Acknowledgment of 
Employee Handbook and "At-Will" Employment 
] have received a copy oHhe Employe* Handbook and 1 understand iln cement*. I understand 
that Ihc handbook is intended to provide an uverviitw of the Company's personnel policies and 
procedures and does nol necessarily represent a)! such policies or procedures I also understand 
lhaf (he Company's personnel policies are guidelines and not legally binding on rely employe 
and thai Lhe Comply reserves the right ID depart from those policies and guidelines or change 
them at itt sole discretion. 
J understand ih&t my employment is "al wilt." 1 u&d&rsUnd that! may quit lor jriy reason 
or no reason at fclUrtd thai my employment may be terminated al any lirat with or without 
cause or notice. 
I also understand that the Company's policies that iruy be set forth Irt the handbook concerning 
procedures connected with any disciplinary action art guidelines and not legally binding on the 
Larry H, Miller Group of Companies. The Comply serves the right to depart fronl those 
policies and guidelines or change them al its sole discretion. 1 also understand arid agree thai no 
person other than Larry H. MUler his the authority to enter into any binding cominitmfcrtt QXr . 
agreement to or with ma, on behaJF or the Company, and that &jiy such conunllmenl or agreement 
must be in writing and signed by BIJ pstriies 
FlnaJOy, I understand thai my acceptance ofthe$e terms and conditions 16 acknowledged by my 
continued employment whether or not 1 elect to execute ihis'acknowledgment. 
Employee Name (Fteasa Prioi)t 
Employee Signature . <^0fiv%*s$/ ^i^^r^iE^\J 
p«t« Tffj&Ur 
Location./Company: K J~Z^ ~Z-—~ 
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EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
This Agreement is entered into as of die 26di day of November, 2007, by and between 
LARRY H. MILLER COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION, a Utah corporation dba KJZZ-
TV ("LHMCC") and STEVE ANDERSON ("Anderson"). LHMCC and Anderson will 
individually be referred lo as a 'Tarty" and will collectively be referred to as die "Parties". ' 
WITNESSETH: ' 
WHEREAS, LHMCC is die owner rind operator of that certain independent UHF 
Channel 14 television station in die Salt Lake City DMA ("KJZZ-TV''); and 
WHEREAS, Anderson is qualified to act as a news anchorperson; and 
WHEREAS, LHMCC desires to procure and Anderson desires to provide Anderson's 
sendees as set forth herein; 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of die mutual promises and covenants contained 
herein, die parties hereto agree as follows: 
1. Employment LHMCC hereby engages Anderson to render his sendees as set forth 
herein to LHMCC during die Term of this. Agreement (as hereinafter defined). Anderson hereby 
accepts such employment and undertalces to perform all of die duties and obligations assumed by 
him hereunder. 
2. Duties and Sendees. 
2.1 During die Term hereof, Anderson shall have die following responsibilities: 
•a. Act as television news anchor for die morning news program on 
KJZZ-TV. It is contemplated die said morning news program will be broadcast five (5) days each 
week (each weekday) from _ _ a.m. lo a.m.; 
b. Perform such odier duties as IJHQMCC may reasonably direct in 
connection with die foregoing. 
p \ T H ^ 
2.2 Anderson shall personally attend up to ( ) public relations and 
odier KJZZrTV functions each year during die Term, at die discretion of LHMCC and witii 
reasonable notice. Anderson agrees to be present for die entire duration of any such functions. 
Anderson shall also appeal* in and/or voice various commercials, as reasonably specified by 
LHMCC, to promote KJZZ/TV. 
2.3 During die Term, Anderson shall be die exclusive property of LHMCC in 
Page I of 8 
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die Salt Lake City Television DMA, and shall render his television and commercial advertising 
sendees solely and exclusively for LHMCC, except as set forth otherwise herein. Ajiderson shall 
clear all public, media and commercial appearances and endorsements with LHMCC prior to 
entering into any agreement witii regard to such appearances. LHMCC may, in LHMCC's sole 
discretion, approve or deny Anderson's request related to an}' such appearance. 
• 2.4 Anderson shall not, during the Tenn hereof, grant to any diird party die 
right to use liis name, voice or likeness for broadcasting, commercial or advertising purposes 
witiiouL die widen consent of LHMCC. Consent shall be granted whenever die broadcast, 
commercial or advertisement is not inconsistent with, the best interests of LHMCC, LHMCC's 
sponsors and advertisers. LHMCC shall be die sole judge of what is or is not in LHMCC's best* 
interests or die best interests of LHMCC's sponsors and advertisers. 
3. Tenn. 
3.1 The term of tiiis Agreement (die "Term") shall commence at 12:01 a.m. on 
November 26, 2007, and shall end at midnight on , 2010 unless sooner terminated 
as provided herein. Provided, LHMCC shall have die option to renew diis Agreement for two 
additional terms (each a "Renewal Term") of one (1) year each ( , 2010 tiirough 
, 2011; and , 2011 through , 2012). Each such option 
shall be exercised by "written notice to Anderson at least ninety (90) days prior to die expiration of 
die dien current Term (or Renewal Term). 
3.2 LHMCC may terminate diis Agreement as of of any year 
during die Term, with or without Cause (defined below), upon written notice to Anderson no later 
tiian of dial year (that is, if LHMCC desires to terminate diis Agreement as of 
, 2009, dien notice must be given to Anderson by , 2009). 
4. Compensation and Expenses. 
4.1 LHMCC shall pay to Anderson, as compensation in exchange for die ' 
satisfactory perfonnance by Anderson of all of his duties and obligations hereunder, the following 
gross salary, less any deductions or offsets permitted hereunder, and 'any deductions tiiat federal 
state and local taring autiiorities require LHMCC to widihold: 
Period of Service 
11/26/07 to J_J08 
_701/08 to _7_709 
_V01/09 to J_J10 
_V01/10 to J_l\ 1 (LHMCC 
option) 
Compensation 
$80,000 
$88,000 
$96,800 
$106,480 
Employment Agi.0* 
1/7/2008 
Page 2 of 8 
i ^ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
/Ol/ll to J_JVt (LHMCC 
option) $117,128 
4.2 Anderson's annual compensation shall he payable in semi-mondily 
installments on die fifteenth and last day of each month, with die first installment to be paid on die 
30* day of November, 2007. 
4.3 Anderson shall receive full employee benefits, including medical insurance 
and 401 (k), commensurate with those benefits offered to other similarly situated full time 
employees of LHMCC from time to time. 
4.4 Anderson shall he eligible to receive paid vacation benefits after die first six 
(6) mondis of die Term, in compliance with LHMCC's vacation policy in force from time to time 
for similarly situated employees. • 
-5. Performance. Anderson shall devote his full time, attention and energy to die 
performance of his sendees hereunder, except as odierwise stated herein. Anderson shall perform 
die same conscientiously and to die full limit of his- ability at all times. He shall promptiy and 
faidifully comply with all die reasonable instructions, directions, requests, rules and regulations of 
LHMCC iii connection tiierewitii. 
6. Conduct Anderson shall not during die Term hereof act in a manner tending to 
be offensive to decency, morality or social propriety, or tending to result in scandal, ridicule or 
contempt, or tending lo provoke any retaliatory action or boycott against ltimself or LHMCC. Any 
waiver of any provision of tins paragraph shall not be deemed a continuing waiver. 
7. Ownership of literary and Reproduction Rights. 
7.1 In addition to Anderson's sendees, LHMCC shall b e entitled to, and shall 
own, solely and exclusively, all literary and reproduction rights thereof, and rights of even7 kind 
therein arising therefrom, and all rights and proceeds derived therefrom. 
7.2 Anderson hereby assigns and transfers to LHMCC all his right, tide and 
interest in and to such rights, witiiout reservation, condition or limitation. If LHMCC desires to 
secure separate assignments tiiereof, Anderson shall promptly execute and deliver die same to 
LHMCC upon request 
7.3 Except as odierwise provided herein, Anderson shall not transfer or attempt 
to transfer to anyone otiier than LHMCC, any right, tide or interest in or to any of die foregoing 
nor shall he at any time make or purport to make any grant to any tiiird party in derogation 
tiiereof. 
7.4 The provisions of this Section 7 shall remain in fall force and effect 
regardless ol" die termination of tiiis Agreement, and regardless of-whedicr such termination occurs 
tlirougli expiration or as a result of cancellation by LHMCC. 
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8> Use of Name and likeness. Except as otherwise provided herein, LHMCC shrill 
have: 
8.1 The exclusive right during die Term hereof Lo use Anderson's name, voice 
and likeness for advertising and promoting KJZZrTY; 
8.2 The non-exclusive right Lo use die same after die termination of diis 
Agreement; and 
8.3 The use hereinabove referred shall not, without Anderson's written 
consent, include (lie use or his name, voice or likeness for general commercial purposes, such as 
the advertising or promotion of a product or sendee by way of endorsement, or otherwise which is 
not associated with or affiliated with LHMCC. 
i 
9. ' ' Insurance- LHMCC shall have die right to apply, at any time or from time to time, 
in its own name or otherwise, and at its own expense, for life, healdi, accident or other insurance 
covering Anderson, in order to protect its interest hereunder. Anderson shall assist LHMCC in 
procuring such insurance by submitting to the customary medical examination and by signing such 
papers as may reasonably be required in connection therewith. Anderson shall have no right, title < 
or interest in or to such insurance or die proceeds thereof. 
10. Teiminalion. 
10 J Dining die Term hereof, LHMCC may, in its sole discretion, with or 
widiout Cause, terminate this Agreement, in its entirety. 
10.2 In die evenL LHMCC lenninates diis Agreement for Cause, LHMCC shall 
be excused from all of its obligations hereunder effective immediately upon die dale of 
Lenuinalion, excepl for any accrued amounts earned by or payable Lo Anderson. Cause shall be 
defined and limited Lo die following: fraud; misappropriation; embezzlement; Anderson's failure lo ( 
.conduct, himself according to die standards set Forth in Section 6 hereof; rendering inappropriate 
or disparaging remarks about LHMCC or its officers, agents, employees or organization; deadi; 
physical or mental disability or impairment lasting more dian diirty (30) days, which in die 
reasonable opinion of LHMCC materially detracts frcjm Anderson's effectiveness in die 
performance of his sendees hereunder; other inability to perform Ins sendees as required -
hereunder, which inability lasts more that diirty (30J days; and, breach of diis Agreement- In the 
event of such disability or inability, in lieu of tenninating diis Agreement, as herein prowled, 
LHMCC shall have die option of suspending its obligations hereunder for die term of such 
disability or inability, and extending die Tcnn of diis Agreement Tor a like period. 
10.3 If Anderson's sendees arc terminated by LHMCC without Cause, < 
Anderson shall be entitled to die average annual salary that would have been paid Lo Anderson 
over die entire remaining Term of diis Agreement, or die remaining unearned salary hereunder, 
whichever is less. Any amounts paid to .Anderson alter such termination shall be payable in die 
same manner as provided in paragraplis 4.1 and 4.2 hereof. In die event LHMCC terminates 
Anderson's sendees, Anderson shall, in good faith, and in order Lo mitigate his damages under diis | 
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paragraph, immediately seek other employment LHMCC shall be entitled to a right of offset 
against any amounts earned by Anderson from such odier employment As a condition precedent 
to LHMCCs obligation to make die payments provided for in this Section 10, Anderson shall 
supply LHMCC, upon its request, with any and all information which is reasonably necessary or 
appropriate for LHMCC to determine whether it is entitled to such offset LHMCC shall also be 
entided to a right ol* offset against all workers* compensation benefits and the proceeds of any 
disability or odier insurance provided by LHMCC, paid or payable to Anderson by reason of any 
disability. 
10.4 Upon the expiration or sooner termination of this Agreement, Anderson 
shall have die right to require dial LHMCC assign to liim any individual life and/or disability 
• insurance provided by LHMCC for Anderson's benefit, so long as (a) Anderson pays to LHMCC 
die cash value, if any, of such policy as of die effective dale of any such assignment and (b) die 
terms of any such policy permit such assignment 
10.5 For a period of one (1) year following die termination of this Agreement, if 
tills Agreement terminates for any reason odier dian LHMCC firing Anderson widiout Cause, 
Anderson shall not directly or indirecdy, individually or in concert widi others or as an employee, 
partner, joint venturer, member, officer, director or shareholder of any business organization, 
financially or odierwise, engage in, become interested in or associate widi any odier individual, 
business, endeavor or entity in die State of Utah which competes, could compete or will compete 
widi LHMCC in any of its businesses. For die purposes of diis Agreement, an individual, business, 
endeavor or entity shall be deemed to be competing if die individual, business, endeavor or entity 
engages in a business substantially similar to diat of KJZZ-TV. Specifically, but not by way of 
limitation, Anderson may not act as an anchorperson on any program on any television station in 
die Salt Lake City Television DMA during such one (1) year period. If LHMCC terminates 
Anderson widiout Cause, dien die one "(I) year non-competition restriction set forth above shall 
not be effective. 
11. No Obligation to Use Services, Subject to LHMCCs obligation to pay Anderson 
die compensation specified herein, LHMCC shall not be obligated to use Anderson's sendees, and 
shall not be liable to Anderson in any way for failure to do so in whole or in part 
12. Equitable Relief. 
12.1 ' Anderson acknowledges tiiat die sen-ices he is to render LHMCC are of a 
special and extraordinary character dial, gives diem a unique value; diat such services cannot be 
replaced; diat die loss of sucli sendees could not be reasonably or adequately compensated by 
damages in an action at law; and diat a breach by him of any provision hereof would cause 
LHMCC immediate and irreparable injury. Accordingly, LHMCC shall have die right: to obtain 
from any court or arbitrator having jurisdiction, widiout die necessity of posting bond, such 
equitable relief as may be appropriate, including a decree enjoining Anderson from any such 
furdier breach hereof. 
12.2 Resort by LHMCC to such relief shall not be construed as a waiver by it of 
any odier right it might have for damages or odierwise. 
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12.3 If Anderson at any time indicates to LHMCC dial he does not intend to 
perform his obligations hereunder, such indication shall constitute a breach diereof on Ms part 
12.4 LHMCCs rights and remedies by reason of Anderson's breach of his 
obligations hereunder shall be cumulative; and die exercise of any one or more of diem shall not 
be exclusive of any odier or odiers LHMCC might have under diis Agreement or by law. 
13. Confidentiality. 
13.1 Neither party shall disclose the terms of diis Agreement; including but not 
limited to die consideration to be given by die parties hereunder, to any diird parts' at any time, 
except only dial Anderson may disclose die terms of diis Agreement and provide a copy diereof to 
any current or prospective employers (subject to all die terms hereof) who reasonably request that 
Anderson do so, and that eidier party may disclose die terms of diis Agreement to such tax and 
legal advisors as are necessary for die respective parlies to properly comply with all existing laws. 
13.2 Further, Anderson acknowledges that during his employment he will 
acquire knowledge of confidential information regarding die business and operations of LHMCC. 
Accordingly, Anderson shall not, widiout the written consent of LHMCC, directiy or indirecdy, 
during die Term or at any time thereafter, disclose to anyone or use in any manner any such 
confidential information, odier dian in connection widi Anderson's sendees hereunder. 
Confidential information shall include infomiation which has been or may be communicated 
orally, in writing, or in any odier recorded or tangible form and information which may have come 
to die attention of Anderson before or after die dale of diis Agreement; and data and information 
shall be considered confidential infomiation if, due to its character, nature or die manner in which 
it is conveyed, a reasonable person in alike position and under like circumstances as Anderson 
would treat it as secret or confidential. The provisions of diis paragraph 13.2 shall not apply to 
data and infomiation that Anderson can prove has become publicly available widiout breach of 
confidence by Anderson or any odier person. If, through no fault of his own, Anderson is 
required to disclose any confidential information pursuant to any legal requirement or court order, 
he shall immediately notify LHMCC and shall cooperate widi LHMCC in seeking to maintain die 
confidentiality of that confidential information (e.g., by placing it under seal) or in selling aside, the 
requirement or order compelling disclosure. 
13.3 Anderson's covenants under diis Section 13 shall apply regardless of die 
reason for die termination of his employment Anderson acknowledges that die remedy at law for 
breach of die provisions of diis Section 13 will be inadequate and tiiat, in addition to an}' odier 
remedy LHMCC may have, LHMCC shall be entided to an injunction restraining any breach or 
direatened breach, widiout any bond or odier security being required and widiout die necessity of 
proving actual damages. 
14. Right to Contract, The parlies hereto represent and warrant to cadi odier tiiat diey 
have die full right and power to enter into diis Agreement; dial except as setfordi herein each does 
not now have, nor will at any time hereafter enter into, any contract or commitment widi any diird 
party tiiat will prevent or interfere witii die full and complete performance of tiieir obligations 
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hereunder, or with die full exercise and enjoyment by die parties of dieir rights hereunder. 
15. Notices. All notices hereunder shall be in writing, and shall be served personally or 
by certified mail, return receipt requested, duly addressed to die parties at dieir respective 
addresses as set forth under dieir signatures at die end of this Agreement If served personally, 
such notice shall be effective upon receipt, and if served by mail, such notice shall be effective two 
(2) days after posting. Either party may specify a different address for die purposes hereof by 
notice given to die otiier in die same manner. 
16. Clause Headings. The headings of the clauses of this Agreement are solely for die 
purpose of convenience. They are not a part hereof, and shall not be used in die construction of 
any provision. 
17. Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed under and in 
accordance with die laws of die State of Utah. 
18. Waiver. No waiver of any of die provisions of this Agreement shall be deemed, or 
shall constitute, a waiver of any other .provision, whether or not similar, nor shall any waiver 
constitute a continuing waiver. No waiver shall be binding unless executed in writing by die party 
making die waiver. 
19. Modification. This Agreement may not be changed or modified except by an 
agreement in writing signed by die party against whom enforcement of die cliange or modification 
is asserted. 
20. Assignment Etc. This Agreement shall not be assigned by Anderson. This 
Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to die benefit of Anderson and LHMCC, and their 
assigns and successors in interest. 
21. Agreement Complete. This Agreement consdtutes die entire understanding 
between die parlies widi respect to die subject matter hereof. 
22. Construction. In die event any part of this Agreement is found to be void, die 
remaining provisions hereof shall, nevertlielcss, be binding widi die same effect as tiiough die void 
part were deleted. 
23. Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in one or more counterparts, each 
of which shall be deemed an original and all such counterparts shall together constitute one and 
die same instrument. 
24. Odier Documents and Acts. Each party shall, at die request of die odier, execute, 
acknowledge and deliver whatever additional instruments, and do such oilier acts, as may be 
required or convenient in order to accomplish and carry forward die intent and purposes of diis 
Agreement, 
25. Attorney Fees. If any claim, arbitration or legal action or otiier proceeding is 
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brought for the interpretation or enforcement of this Agreement, or because of an alleged dispute 
breach, default or misrepresentation in connection with any of the provisions of the Agreement, 
die successful or prevailing party shall be enlided to recover actual attorney fees (whedier or not 
die legal services are rendered by a salaried employee of die party), expert witness fees and odier 
costs and expenses incurred in die enforcement of this Agreement, whedier by filing suit or not, 
but not die cosLs of dieir appointed arbitrator, in addition to any other relief to which dial party 
may be enlided. 
LARRY H. MILLER COMMUNICATIONS 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation dba 
KJZZ-TV 
By . : _ — 
Printed Name STEVE ANDERSON 
Its 
Address: Address: 
301 West Soudi Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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Westlaw. 
Not Reported in N.E.2d, 2000 WL 1434170 (Ohio App. 1 Dist.) 
(Cite as: 2000 WL 1434170 (Ohio App. 1 Dist.)) 
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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
CHECK OHIO SUPREME COURT RULES FOR 
REPORTING OF OPINIONS AND WEIGHT OF 
LEGAL AUTHORITY. 
Court of Appeals of Ohio, First District, Hamilton 
County. 
Julie ROLSEN, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 
v. 
LAZARUS, INC., Defendant-Ap-
pellee/Cross-Appellant. 
Nos. C-990588, C-990627. 
Sept. 29, 2000. 
Civil Appeal From Hamilton County Court of Com-
mon Pleas. Judgment Appealed from is Affirmed in 
Part, Reversed in Part, and Final Judgment Entered. 
David Torchia and Tobias, Kraus & Torchia, for 
plaintiff-appellant/cross-appellee. 
Deborah Adams and Frost & Jacobs, and Robert P. 
Joy, Morgan and Brown & Joy, for defendant-ap-
pellee/cross-appellant. 
OPINION 
GORMAN. 
*1 Julie Rolsen was terminated from her job with 
Lazarus, Inc., as Clinique Counter Manager, after 
being accused of stealing a watch from the watch 
department. Rolsen subsequently brought claims of 
promissory estoppel, defamation, and breach of im-
plied contract against the company. A jury awarded 
her $53,400 on her promissory-estoppel claim. The 
trial court, however, granted a remittitur, reducing 
the judgment to $17,833. Lazarus received directed 
verdicts on the contract and defamation claims. 
Both parties have appealed. Rolsen asserts in her 
two assignments of error that the trial court erred 
by granting Lazarus directed verdicts on the defam-
ation and contract claims and by reducing the dam-
age award. Lazarus, in its cross-appeal, asserts that 
the trial court erred in denying its motions for a dir-
ected verdict, for a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, and for a new trial on the promissory-estop-
pel claim. For the reasons that follow, we find no 
merit in Rolsen's first assignment of error and con-
sider her second assignment moot. However, we 
find merit in Lazarus's assignment of error in its 
cross-appeal and, therefore, reverse the judgment of 
the trial court on the promissory-estoppel claim. 
FACTS 
Rolsen's firing occurred on October 10, 1996, a day 
on which she forgot to wear her watch to work at a 
Dayton Lazarus store. Rolsen testified that, on that 
day, there was a special promotional event, and 
consequently she had a special need for a watch, 
because makeover appointments were scheduled all 
day and part of her duties was monitoring the con-
sultants performing the makeovers. In order to have 
a watch to wear, she admittedly took a watch from 
the display counter in the watch department, re-
moved the tag from the watch, placed the tag be-
hind the keyboard on the cash register so it would 
not get lost, and then slipped the watch around her 
wrist. She testified that she had seen other store em-
ployees similarly borrowing merchandise, such as 
sweaters when they were cold, reading glasses 
when they could not read tags, and barrettes when 
they were required to wear their hair back. She 
could not say, however, whether those other bor-
rowings by employees were done with permission 
or otherwise condoned by store management. 
Rolsen did not advise the watch-department sales 
associate of her actions. When asked why she had 
not, she explained that, in her view, the watch-
department sales associate was too far distant and 
out of earshot. However, when she returned to the 
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Clinique counter, Rolsen showed the watch to Mary 
Lynn Meier, a Clinique account coordinator who 
described herself as the "equivalent to a department 
manager of the store." Rolsen testified that she con-
sidered Meier her "boss" as well as her supervisor; 
Meier testified that Rolsen was her "subordinate." 
According to Meier, Rolsen came over to her, told 
her that she had left her watch at home, and then 
said words to the effect, "Look at this watch I have 
borrowed." Meier testified that Rolsen did not, 
however, tell her that she had taken the watch from 
the watch display counter, that she had taken the 
tag off the watch, or that she had chosen not to in-
form the watch-counter associate. Asked if she had 
said anything to Rolsen about whether her taking 
the watch was proper, Meier said, "No," although 
Meier did testify that she personally saw nothing 
wrong with Rolsen borrowing the watch. According 
to Rolsen, she believed that Meier had the authority 
to grant her permission to wear the watch, and that, 
by saying nothing critical, Meier had tacitly given 
her consent to what she had done. Meier testified, 
however, that she did not have the authority to give 
Rolsen or any other employee permission to take 
merchandise off the rack or counter and use it for a 
day. 
*2 Rolsen and Meier both testified that Rolsen had 
asked Meier and another counter employee to re-
mind her to take the watch off and return it before 
the end of the day. Rolsen and Meier then worked 
the counter until noon, at which point they left the 
store to have lunch together at a mall restaurant, 
Ruby Tuesdays. 
While eating, the two women were interrupted by 
the security manager of the Lazarus store, Joyce 
Kyne, and a Lazarus security detective, Joe 
Hendrickson. Hendrickson had observed Rolsen 
taking the watch from the watch department-her ac-
tions were videotaped by surveillance cameras-and, 
believing that he had witnessed a theft, had repor-
ted the matter to Kyne. Kyne had instructed 
Hendrickson to put Rolsen under surveillance. Be-
cause Rolsen had left the store to go to lunch while 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No 
still wearing the watch, Kyne and Hendrickson fol-
lowed her into the restaurant. When they appeared, 
Rolsen testified that she had immediately realized 
that the watch was the reason. Rolsen testified, "I 
said, £Oh, my God, it's about the watch, isn't it?' I 
forgot to take the watch off before I went to lunch. I 
realized at that point that Joyce probably had not 
been briefed on what was happening, otherwise, she 
would not have been there." 
Rolsen testified that Kyne had asked her to accom-
pany her back to her office to discuss the matter. 
She stated that both Kyne and Hendrickson had 
"escorted me through the mall into the Lazarus 
store." A ccording to Rolsen, her colleagues stared 
at the trio as they progressed through the store, 
since both Kyne and Hendrickson were known to 
other employees as being in charge of security. 
When they arrived at Kyne's office, Rolsen ex-
plained to Kyne the circumstances surrounding her 
wearing the watch and said that Meier could cor-
roborate her story. Bob Monroe, the Human Re-
sources Manager, was called into the office, and 
Rolsen repeated her story. According to Rolsen, 
both Kyne and Monroe refused her request that they 
speak to Meier to verify her story, each telling her 
that the incident did not concern Meier. Rolsen was 
told that if she had wished to make use of the watch 
for a day, she should have purchased it in the morn-
ing and returned it for a refund at the end of her shift. 
Monroe then left the office to call corporate 
headquarters in Atlanta, and while he was awaiting 
a return call, he advised Rolsen that she was imme-
diately suspended and would have to leave the 
store. Monroe and Hendrickson then walked Rolsen 
out of the store, dispatching someone else to get her 
belongings. Later that evening, Monroe called 
Rolsen at home to tell her that she had been fired 
due to the severity of the offense. She then went 
back to the store that same evening to get her re-
maining personal belongings. While doing so, she 
was kept under surveillance by security personnel. 
She described the scene at the Clinique counter as 
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emotional, with both her and her colleagues crying 
over her firing. 
DEFAMATION 
In her first assignment of error, Rolsen argues that 
the trial court erred by granting Lazarus's motion 
for a directed verdict on her defamation claim. She 
contends that there was evidence of record upon 
which a reasonable person could conclude that Laz-
arus had defamed her by (1) announcing to her col-
leagues that she had been fired for theft, (2) having 
security personnel escort her through the store in 
front of her colleagues, and (3) making it necessary 
to indicate to prospective employers that she had 
been dismissed for theft. 
*3 As this court has previously noted, when an act 
of alleged defamation has occurred in a business or 
professional context by someone whose job gives to 
them a legitimate interest in the matter, it is subject 
to a qualified privilege. The result is that the 
plaintiff must prove not only that the representa-
tions were untrue, but that they were made with ac-
tual malice. See Contadino v. Blow (1990), 68 
Ohio App.3d 463, 469-470, 589 N.E.2d 48, 52. A 
showing of actual malice requires evidence that the 
alleged perpetrator, acting out of spite or ill will, 
made the representations either with knowledge 
that they were false, see Hahn v. Kotten (1975), 43 
Ohio St.2d 237, 331 N.E.2d 713, or with reckless 
disregard for the truth. See New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan (1976), 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710. 
To demonstrate a reckless disregard for the truth, 
the plaintiff must present clear and convincing 
evidence that the untrue statements were made as a 
result of the defendant's failure to act reasonably to 
discover the truth. See Lairsdowne v. Beacon Journ-
al Publishing Co. (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 176, 180, 
512 N.E.2d 979, 984. However, in order for the de-
fendant to fail to act reasonably in such a situation, 
he or she must first possess some degree of subject-
ive doubt concerning the statements. A person 
speaking with moral certainty about a subject with 
which he or she has a qualified privilege, no matter 
how misguided, cannot be said to be acting with ac-
tual malice. As the Ohio Supreme Court has stated, 
In order to establish "reckless disregard," the 
plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to permit 
a finding that the defendant had serious doubts as to 
the truth of his publication. Thus, the failure to in-
vestigate before publishing will not defeat a quali-
fied privilege, unless the defendant entertained seri-
ous doubts as to the truth of the statements or the 
veracity or accuracy of his sources. 
A & B-Abell v. Columbus/Cent. Ohio Bldg. & Con-
str. Trades Council (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 1, 12-13, 
651 N.E.2d 1283, 1293-1294, citing St Amant v. 
Thompson (1968), 390 U.S. 727, 88 S.Ct. 1323, and 
Dale v. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emp. Assn. (1991), 57 Ohio 
St.3dll2,567N.E.2d253. 
Examples of "reckless disregard" are situations in 
which the defendant fabricated the story, relies on 
his or her imagination, or based the statements on 
unverified, anonymous sources. See id. Because 
mere negligence is not enough to establish actual 
malice, the test for determining whether the defend-
ant entertained "serious doubt" is not an objective 
one-/.e., whether a reasonable person should have 
questioned the truth of his or her statements. 
Rather, the test is a subjective one, requiring the 
plaintiff to produce clear and convincing evidence 
that the defendant "in fact" entertained serious 
doubts about the truth of his statements or the sin-
cerity or accuracy of his sources. See id. 
The trial court's decision to grant Lazarus a directed 
verdict on the defamation claim presents this ques-
tion of law: whether, construing the evidence most 
strongly in favor of Rolsen, reasonable jurors could 
have come to but one conclusion, that being that 
she was not defamed. See Strother v. Hutchinson 
(1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 282, 423 N.E.2d 467. 
*4 Having reviewed the record, we hold that Rolsen 
did not present any evidence upon which a reason-
able person could have concluded that any of the 
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Lazarus employees involved in her firing acted with 
actual malice. There is no evidence that any of the 
principals thought her innocent of what, in their 
view, constituted a form of in-store theft. Nor is 
there any evidence that they subjectively enter-
tained "serious doubts" about whether what she did 
was impermissible under company rules. Rather, 
the evidence demonstrates that Kyne, Monroe, and 
Hendrickson were absolutely convinced that 
Rolsen's actions constituted a theft of the watch, 
even if they accepted her explanation. In the com-
pany's view, there was simply no authority upon 
which she could have borrowed the watch in such a 
manner without first paying for it. Thus, the fact 
that no one spoke to Meier to corroborate Rolsen's 
story is immaterial, since, in the view of her ac-
cusers, Meier was without authority to sanction 
what Rolsen had done. 
Rolsen additionally argues that her physical treat-
ment-for example, being led through the store by 
security-constituted a form of defamation by con-
duct under our decision in Uebelacker v. Cincom 
Systems, Inc. (1988), 80 Ohio App.3d 97, 608 
N.E.2d 858. We disagree. The actions of the Laz-
arus employees here simply do not compare to the 
extreme, outrageous conduct of the company's em-
ployees in Uebelacker. Nor do we find persuasive 
Rolsen's argument that she was defamed by her 
own republication of the reason for her firing in ap-
plying for subsequent positions. 
In sum, although the jury may have been given suf-
ficient evidence to have wished that Lazarus had 
treated Rolsen more leniently and open-mindedly in 
light of the obvious mitigating factors involved, 
there was simply no evidence by which the jury 
could have clearly and convincingly found that the 
company's employees either spread deliberate false-
hoods about Rolsen or possessed serious doubts 
that her borrowing of the watch constituted in-store 
theft. Thus, we affirm the trial court's decision to 
grant the company a directed verdict on the defam-
ation claim. 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No 
IMPLIED CONTRACT 
Rolsen argues that the trial court erred by granting 
Lazarus a directed verdict on her claim that her fir-
ing violated an implied contract limiting the com-
pany's right to fire her at will. She bases this argu-
ment on three grounds: (1) that Lazarus had a prac-
tice of terminating employees only for just cause; 
(2) that Lazarus had a practice and policy of pro-
gressive discipline; and (3) that Meier's acquies-
cence in her borrowing of the watch constituted an 
implied promise that she would not be fired for do-
ing so. 
According to the express terms of her employment 
with Lazarus, Rolsen's employment was at will. An 
at-will employment may generally be terminated at 
any time by either party, for no reason or for any 
reason. See Wright v. Honda America Mfg., Inc. 
(1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 571, 653 N.E.2d 381. Con-
cededly, the at-will status of an employee may be 
modified by a subsequent express or implied con-
tract altering the at-will relationship. See Mers v. 
Dispatch Printing Co. (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 100, 
483 N.E.2d 150, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
However, here the terms of Rolsen's employment 
expressly disclaimed that any company employee 
below the rank of Senior Vice President of Human 
Resources could alter her at-will status. Her em-
ployment application with the company spelled this 
out unequivocally, stating, 
*5 I agree to conform to the rules and regulations of 
the Company, and if employed, I understand and 
agree that my employment is at-will and no em-
ployment contract rights have been created. I also 
understand and agree that my employment may be 
terminated at any time with or without cause, and 
with or without advance notice at the option of 
either the Company or myself. / also understand 
that no supervisor, manager or other representative 
of the company has any authority to enter into any 
express or implied contract for employment for any 
specific period of time. Any agreement contrary to 
the above must be in writing and must expressly 
state that it is a contract and be signed by the Seni-
iim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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or Vice President, Human Resources. 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
Given the express terms of Rolsen's employment, 
plainly stating that she was an at-will employee 
subject to termination "with or without cause" un-
less otherwise agreed to in writing by the Senior 
Vice President in charge of Human Resources, her 
arguments in favor of an implied contract are un-
persuasive. See Hall v. The Jewish Hosp. of Cincin-
nati (June 2, 2000), Hamilton App. No. C-990571, 
unreported. Although several Lazarus employees 
testified that the company "d[id] not take personnel 
actions without good reason," this fact alone could 
not alter the express terms of Rolsen's employment. 
Every company, presumably, does not take person-
nel actions without good reason. Simply because a 
company does not fire its at-will employees arbit-
rarily does not mean that it has assented to a modi-
fication of their at-will status. If such were the case, 
a company would have to either espouse a policy or 
engage in a practice of random firings in order to 
avoid such a modification. 
Rolsen's argument that Lazarus had a practice of 
progressive discipline, and that such a practice was 
not followed here, is similarly unpersuasive. The 
policy to which she refers appears in the employee 
handbook. The handbook, however, expressly dis-
claims that it creates any contractual rights. In fact, 
Rolsen was required to sign the following statement 
contained in the handbook: "I understand that noth-
ing in this handbook is to be construed as a direct, 
implied or inferred contract of employment." 
Finally, we reject Rolsen's argument that Meier's 
acquiescence in her borrowing of the watch consti-
tuted a promise that she would not be fired for do-
ing so. According to the express terms of her em-
ployment, only the Senior Vice President in charge 
of Human Resources could alter the at-will nature 
of her employment in writing. Therefore, even if 
Meier had intended to make such a promise, she 
had no authority to do so. Second, as Lazarus cor-
rectly points out, there is no evidence to suggest 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No 
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that Meier intended to make such a promise. As we 
have held before, simply because an employee 
chooses to subjectively believe that he or she is 
something more than an at-will employee, that does 
not create an implied contract. An implied contract 
requires more than just an inference by one of the 
parties; there must be a meeting of the minds and 
mutual assent. See Weiper, supra; Reasoner v. Bill 
Woeste Chevrolet, Inc. (1999), 134 Ohio App.3d 
196,730,730N.E.2d992,995. 
*6 We hold, therefore, that there was no evidence 
of record from which a reasonable person could 
conclude that Lazarus had entered into an implied 
contract altering Rolsen's at-will employment status. 
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND REMITTITUR 
In her second assignment of error, Rolsen argues 
that the trial court erred by reducing the damages 
the jury awarded On her promissory-estoppel claim. 
In its sole assignment of error in its cross-appeal, 
Lazarus argues that the trial court erred in denying 
its motions for a directed verdict, a judgment not-
withstanding the verdict, or a new trial on the same 
claim. Since it attacks the judgment itself, we ad-
dress Lazarus's assignment first. 
In addition to an implied contract, a second excep-
tion applies to the at-will doctrine: promissory es-
toppel. See Mers, supra, paragraph three of the syl-
labus. In order for this exception to apply, however, 
there must be a clear, unambiguous promise of em-
ployment by the employer, and the employee must 
reasonably rely on that promise. See Mers, sup ra, 
paragraph three of the syllabus; Weiper, supra; 
Reasoner, supra. The test is "whether the employer 
should have reasonably expected its representation 
to be relied upon by the employee, and if so, wheth-
er the expected action or forbearance actually resul-
ted and was detrimental to the employee ." Mers, 
supra, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
The basis of Rolsen's promissory-estoppel claim 
Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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was that Meier's acquiescence in her borrowing of 
the watch constituted a promise, expressed in words 
and conduct, that "she would not be fired for using 
the watch." According to Rolsen, when she ap-
proached Meier and advised her of her plan to use 
the watch, "it was incumbent on Meier, if such con-
duct was improper, to stop it or to make Plaintiff 
aware of the consequences." Meier's failure to do 
so, she contends, made it reasonable for her to be-
lieve that Meier had given her authorization to use 
the watch, accompanied by a promise that she 
would not be fired for doing so. 
The fallacy of this argument is several-fold. First, 
according to the express terms of her employment, 
only the Senior Vice President in charge of Human 
Resources could alter the terms of Rolsen's at-will 
employment. In fact, the express terms specifically 
stated that a manager-level employee did not have 
the authority to enter into a contract for extended 
employment. Thus, even if we assume that Meier 
had made a promise of continued employment, 
Rolsen's reliance upon it would not have been reas-
onable, since she was expected to have read and un-
derstood the language in her employment applica-
tion. Second, Meier's words and actions, as nebu-
lous as they were, fell far short of a clear, unam-
biguous promise of continued employment. Meier 
testified that she did not say anything to Rolson 
concerning the propriety of Rolsen taking the 
watch, commenting only upon its appearance-that 
she considered it unattractive. Although she testi-
fied that she did not personally feel that borrowing 
the watch was wrong, Meier did not convey any 
sort of promise to Rolsen that she was immune 
from punishment should she get caught by other 
company personnel ranked above her. Indeed, Mei-
er could not have made such a promise since, as she 
testified, she knew she did not have the authority to 
grant employees leave to take merchandise for then-
own personal use. 
*7 We hold, therefore, that, as a matter of law, Mei-
er's words and conduct did not constitute a clear 
and unambiguous promise of continued employ-
r\ ,1 / 
ment. Her silence and failure to protest could have 
been construed in any number of ways, such as a 
personal willingness to allow Rolsen to wear the 
watch at her own risk. To hold otherwise would 
create a rule that passive acceptance by a lower-
echelon store manager of a rules infraction that he 
or she has no authority to condone creates a binding 
promise on the company that no disciplinary action 
will be taken. Such a result is completely unsuppor-
ted by law. 
We thus find merit in Lazarus's assignment in its 
cross-appeal. Even construing the evidence most 
strongly in favor of Rolsen, reasonable minds could 
not have concluded that Meier had made a clear and 
unambiguous promise of continued employment, or 
that Rolsen's reliance on such a promise, even if 
made, was reasonable. We hold, therefore, that the 
trial court erred in denying Lazarus's motion for a 
directed verdict on Rolsen's promissory-estoppel 
claim. Consequently, Rolsen's second assignment 
of error, in which she argues that the trial court 
erred in reducing the damage award on this claim, 
is rendered moot. 
In sum, we sustain Lazarus's sole assignment of er-
ror, overrule Rolsen's first assignment of error, and 
deem Rolsen's second assignment to be moot upon 
our validation of Lazarus's assignment of error. 
Thus, we affirm the judgment entered below to the 
extent that it granted directed verdicts to Lazarus on 
Rolsen's contract and defamation claims. However, 
upon our determination that the trial court erred in 
denying a directed verdict for Lazarus on Rolsen's 
promissory-estoppel claim, we reverse that portion 
of the judgment awarding Rolsen damages on her 
promissory-estoppel claim and enter judgment for 
Lazarus on that claim. 
Judgment accordingly. 
SUNDERMANN, J., concurs. 
HILDEBRANDT, P.J., concurs separately. 
HELDEBRANDT, P.J., concurring separately. 
Before addressing Rolsen's employment claims, I 
would like to clarify my understanding of the 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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"actual malice" standard in defamation cases. The 
actual malice required for liability in defamation 
cases is different from the type of malice required 
to prove entitlement to punitive damages in other 
types of cases and has nothing to do with spite or ill 
will. In the context of a defamation claim, a person 
acts with actual malice when the person acts with 
"knowledge that the statements are false or with 
reckless disregard of whether they are false or not." 
mi
 W hile spite or ill will might provide evidence 
of a defendant's reckless disregard for the truth of a 
statement, a plaintiff is not required to show the ex-
istence of spite or ill will to defeat a claim of priv-
ilege. In this case, Rolsen presented no evidence 
either that Lazarus either knew that the statements 
were not true or that it acted recklessly in that re-
gard. I agree with the majority's disposition of that 
issue. 
FN1. See Hahn v. Rotten (1975), 43 Ohio 
St.2d 237, 331 N.E.2d 713, paragraph two 
of the syllabus; Jacobs v. Frank (1991), 60 
Ohio St.3d 111, 573 N.K2d 609, paragraph 
two of the syllabus; A & B-Abell Elevator 
Co. v. Columbus /Central Ohio Bldg. & 
Constr. Trades Council (1995), 73 Ohio 
St.3d 1, 651 N.E.2d 1283; see, also, Gur-
easko v. Bethesda Hosp. (1996), 116 Ohio 
App.3d724,689N.E.2d76. 
*8 Turning to the employment-law issues, I write 
separately to emphasize my belief that the existence 
of a disclaimer in a handbook will not always de-
feat an implied-contract claim based on conduct or 
representations outside of the handbook. 
In Wing v. Anchor Media, Ltd. of Texas, the Su-
preme Court of Ohio held that "[a]bsent fraud in the 
inducement, a disclaimer in an employee handbook 
stating that employment is at will precludes an em-
ployment contract other than at will based upon the 
terms of the employee handbook " FN2 In Atkinson 
v. International Technegroup, Inc.,™ the employ-
ment manual stated specifically that employment 
was at will. However, managers from the company 
testified that the company had a policy to treat em-
ployees fairly and not to discharge employees ex-
cept for a good reason. The managers practiced this 
policy, and the employee was aware of its applica-
tion in specific circumstances. In Atkinson, this 
court upheld the jury verdict in the plaintiffs favor 
on his implied-contract claims despite the disclaim-
er. 
FN2. (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 108, 570 
N.E.2d 1095, paragraph one of the syllabus 
(emphasis added). 
FN3. (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 349, 666 
N.E.2d 257. 
Thus, even if a handbook contains a disclaimer, the 
disclaimer will preclude only those contract claims 
based on the terms of the handbook and will not 
preclude a claim of implied contract based on the 
course of dealing between the parties or other facts 
and circumstances reflecting the implicit and expli-
cit terms of an employee's employment. In this 
case, apart from the handbook, Rolsn only presen-
ted the statements of a few employees that Lazarus 
did not make personnel decisions without good 
reason. Her evidence fell far short of demonstrating 
the type of policy that existed in Atkinson despite 
the disclaimer in the handbook. Her evidence 
failed, as a matter of law, to show that fair treat-
ment and just-cause discharge were implied condi-
tions of her employment. 
Likewise, a disclaimer in an application or a hand-
book should not preclude a plaintiff from establish-
ing a claim of promissory estoppel in an appropri-
ate case. The basis of a claim for promissory estop-
pel is detrimental reliance. The elements are dis-
tinct from those of a contract claim. The court 
stated in Wing that the existence of a disclaimer in a 
handbook precludes a contract claim "based upon 
the terms of the employee handbook. " FN4 I do not 
believe that the disclaimer should be extended to 
preclude non-contract claims based on conduct or 
representations made outside of the handbook.™5 
FN4. (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 108, 570 
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N.E.2d 1095, paragraph one of the syl- labus. Please Note: 
FN5. See Randleman v. Dick Masheter 
Ford, Inc. (Aug. 22, 1991), Franklin App. 
No. 91AP-201, unreported, (disclaimer in 
application bars claim of implied contract 
based on application, but not claim of es-
toppel based on other promises). 
In this case, the only promise on which Rolsen al-
legedly relied was the silence of the manager when 
Rolsen showed her the watch that she was wearing. 
Her evidence was insufficient, as a matter of law, to 
demonstrate the type of reasonably specific promise 
or statement that is required for an estoppel claim. I 
do not think that we need to reach the question of 
whether her reliance was reasonable. However, 
since the majority has addressed this issue, I am 
concurring separately to state my disagreement 
with the proposition that Rolsen's reliance was, as a 
matter of law, unreasonable because of the dis-
claimers in the Lazarus handbooks. 
The court has placed of record its own entry in this 
case on the date of the release of this Opinion. 
Ohio App. 1 Dist.,2000. 
Rolsen v. Lazarus, Inc. 
Not Reported in N.E.2d, 2000 WL 1434170 (Ohio 
App. 1 Dist.) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
*9 Finally, I disagree with the statement of the ma-
jority that "every company, presumably, does not 
take personnel actions without good reason." With 
the numerous decisions in this state alone uphold-
ing jury or bench awards on discrimination claims, 
the existence of employers like the one in Wing 
who terminate employees who call attention to their 
employer's illegal acts, and the policy in this state 
of upholding the right of an employer to terminate 
an employee for any reason or no reason, I cannot 
agree that "every employer" makes personnel de-
cisions for good reasons. The presumption used in 
employment cases like this one is not that the em-
ployer discharged the employee for a good reason, 
but that the reason, whether good or bad, is irrelev-
ant to the lawfulness of the decision. Even if the 
employer in this case had a good reason to termin-
ate Rolsen's employment, the majority's statement 
is far too broad. 
For the foregoing reasons, I separately concur in 
this case. 
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UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Michigan. 
Chad WATERMAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
GREEKTOWN CASINO, Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 244213. 
April 13, 2004. 
Before: WILDER, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and 
KELLY, JJ. 
[UNPUBLISHED] 
PER CURIAM. 
*1 In this employment case arising out of plaintiffs 
claims of wrongful termination, defendant was 
granted leave to appeal the order denying defendant 
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We 
reverse. 
Defendant first argued on appeal that the trial court 
erred in denying summary disposition to defendant 
because this Court has held that when a handbook 
contains conflicting language, but also contains a 
contractual disclaimer, an employee cannot, as a 
matter of law, reasonably and legitimately expect 
that a just-cause contract has been created. We agree. 
We review de novo a trial court's ruling on a mo-
tion for summary disposition brought under MCR 
2.116(C)(10). UAW-GM Human Resources Center 
v KSL Recreation Corp, 228 Mich.App 486, 490; 
579 NW2d 411 (1998). Under MCR 2.116(C)(10), 
a party may move for dismissal of all or part of a 
claim based on the assertion that there is no genu-
ine issue with respect to any material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judg-
ment as a matter of law. Universal Underwriters 
Group v. Allstate Ins Co, 246 MichApp 713, 720; 
635 NW2d 52 (2001). When reviewing the motion, 
the court must consider the affidavits, pleadings, 
depositions, admissions, and other documentary 
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmov-
ing party. Id. 
"At will" is the presumed employment relationship 
in Michigan. Lynas v. Maxwell Farms, 279 Mich. 
684, 687; 273 NW 315 (1937). However, a just-
cause employment relationship can be found "as a 
result of an employee's legitimate expectations 
grounded in an employer's policy statements." 
Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 
408 Mich. 579, 598; 292 NW2d 880 (1980). The 
proper inquiry is whether the employer, through its 
employment manual or otherwise, made representa-
tions or promises that termination would be only 
for just cause. Biggs v. Hilton Hotel Corp, 194 
MichApp 239, 241; 486 NW2d 61 (1992). 
Plaintiff argued that conflicting provisions in de-
fendant's handbook created ambiguity regarding his 
employment status. To support this contention, 
plaintiff relied on this Court's decision in Dalton v. 
Herbruck Egg Sales Corp, 164 Mich.App 543, 547; 
417 NW2d 496 (1987), where this Court found that 
when an employee handbook contains language 
providing for both just-cause and at-will termina-
tion, the question whether a just-cause contract has 
been formed is a question of fact for a jury. 
However, the controlling case in these circum-
stances is our Supreme Court's decision, Lytle v. 
Malady (On Rehearing), 458 Mich. 153, 162; 579 
NW2d 906 (1998), where the employee manual at 
issue contained both at-will and just-cause employ-
ment language, and it also contained language stat-
ing that it was not intended to create any contractu-
al obligations. The Court held that the plaintiff 
could not assert a legitimate expectation of just-
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cause employment based on the employer's policy 
to terminate only for cause where the handbook 
specifically disclaimed any intent to create contrac-
tual or binding obligations to employees. Id. at 157, 
170-171. 
*2 Moreover, although not specifically overruling 
Dalton, the Lytle Court expressly rejected the sug-
gestion that it create a new rule that would apply 
whenever a handbook contained conflicting policies 
and found instead that a legitimate-expectation 
claim does not automatically arise whenever a 
handbook contains mixed messages. Id. at 170 n. 
16. "[T]he plaintiff must still provide sufficient 
evidence to raise a triable question that the policy 
arguably instilled a legitimate expectation that su-
perseded the express contractual disclaimer." Id. 
Additionally, we reject plaintiffs argument that 
Lytle is distinguishable because Lytle was based on 
claims of discrimination and the manual at issue in 
that case contained the words "proper cause" in-
stead of "just cause." With regard to the claims 
presented, although the plaintiff in Lytle, sup ra at 
157, did allege age and gender discrimination, it 
was a distinct claim from the plaintiffs breach of 
contract claims. Regarding the terminology of 
"proper" versus "just," we disagree that there is any 
difference between proper cause and just cause in 
this context. See Scholz v. Montgomery Ward & 
Co, Inc, 437 Mich. 83, 107; 468 NW2d 845 (1991). 
Regardless which adjective is used, the meaning is 
the same-there is a contractual limitation on the em-
ployer's right to terminate employment, and the em-
ployer cannot fire the employee without some sort 
of reasonable justification or cause. See Lytle, 
supra at 164. 
Here, defendant's employee handbook contains a 
contractual disclaimer, which clarifies that only the 
chief operating officer of the company has the au-
thority to enter into contracts with employees. 
Plaintiff confirmed that he read and signed an ac-
knowledgment setting forth a similar disclaimer, 
and he stated that he had never met the chief oper-
ating officer, let alone entered into a contract with 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. 
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him. Thus, consistent with our Supreme Court's 
holding in Lytle, supra at 157, 170-171, we find 
that the trial court erred in denying defendant's mo-
tion for summary disposition because plaintiff 
could not as a matter of law have had a legitimate 
expectation of just-cause employment. 
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in 
denying summary disposition to defendant because 
plaintiff has not offered any evidence to suggest 
that he either discussed or entered into a just-cause 
employment contract with defendant or it agents. 
We agree. 
In addition to legitimate expectations based on an 
employer's policy statements, a just-cause employ-
ment relationship can be found "by express agree-
ment, oral or written." Toussaint, supra at 598. Ac-
cordingly, plaintiff argued that Greektown's chief 
operating officer (COO) admitted that Greektown 
employees have a just-cause employment relation-
ship. 
"The starting point in analyzing oral statements for 
contractual implications is to determine the mean-
ing that reasonable persons might have attached to 
the language, given the circumstances presented." 
Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co, 437 Mich. 627, 
640; 473 NW2d 268 (1991). The statements must 
be "specific statements with regard to duration of 
employment or grounds for termination," and show 
"indication of an actual negotiation or an intent to 
contract for permanent or just-cause employment." 
Lytle, supra at 172. Further, oral statements of job 
security must be clear and unequivocal to overcome 
the presumption of employment at will. Biggs, 
supra at 242. 
*3 The COO's statements do not reasonably rise to 
the level of clear and unequivocal statements of job 
security for two reasons. First, when asked about 
the language in the handbook, the COO only con-
firmed that the handbook stated that there would 
have to be a valid business-related reason to termin-
ate an employee. Second, as defendant points out, 
both the acknowledgment and the handbook state 
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contracts with employees. As discussed, plaintiff 
never met the COO, let alone entered into a con-
tract with him. Thus, even if the COO believed that 
defendant's employees had just-cause employment 
relationships, plaintiff could not have relied on this 
belief when plaintiff was not aware of it until after 
his cause of action had been initiated and the de-
position testimony was taken. 
Moreover, plaintiff testified that instead of a tradi-
tional interview, he had an audition, during which 
he demonstrated his dice dealing skills. After the 
audition, he was immediately offered a job, but no 
one talked to him about the terms and conditions of 
employment or reasons for termination at that time, 
and the only question he asked was about the rate 
of pay. He stated that no one ever told him that he 
was an at-will employee, but no one ever told him 
that he could only be terminated for cause either. 
Thus, by plaintiffs own admission, he never 
entered into an actual negotiation or an had any 
conversations regarding the intent to contract for 
permanent or just-cause employment. See Lytle, 
supra at 172. Therefore, we find that the trial court 
erred in denying summary disposition to defendant. 
Defendant also argued that even if plaintiff had a 
just-cause contract, the trial court erred in denying 
summary disposition to defendant because it had a 
valid, business-related reason to terminate plaintiff 
based on its uniformly applied policy to terminate 
employees who fail to catch cheaters on numerous 
occasions. However, we need not address this issue 
in light of our holding that a just-cause contract did 
not exist. 
Reversed and remanded for entry of summary dis-
position in defendant's favor. We do not retain jur-
isdiction. 
Mich.App.,2004. 
Waterman v. Greektown Casino 
Not Reported in N.W.2d, 2004 WL 787157 
(Mich.App.) 
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NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RE-
LEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE PER-
MANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, 
IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAW-
AL. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
PRECISION TIME, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
EQUITY PROPERTIES AND DEVELOPMENT 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, an Illinois limited part-
nership, doing business in Utah as Equity Proper-
ties and Development (Illinois) Limited Partner-
ship, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 990982-CA. 
Oct. 25, 2001. 
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Before JACKSON, ORME, and THORNE, JJ. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
ORME, Judge. 
*1 Whether an oral agreement can be enforceable 
when the parties contemplated the execution of a 
written agreement is a question of intent. See Doll 
v. Grand Union Co., 925 F.2d 1363, 1370 (11th 
Cir.1991); Engineering Assoc, v. Irving Place As-
soc, 622 P.2d 784, 787 (Utah 1980). "There does 
not appear to be any doubt that if the parties make 
it clear that they do not intend that there should be 
legal consequences unless and until a formal writ-
ing is executed, there is no contract until that time." 
Engineering Assoc, 622 P.2d at 787. See RJ. 
Daum Constr. Co. v. Child, 247 P.2d 817, 820 
(Utah 1952) (explaining that " 'if an intention is 
manifested in any way that legal obligations 
between the parties shall be deferred until the writ-
ing is made, the preliminary negotiations and agree-
ments do not constitute a contract' ") (quoting Re-
statement of Contracts § 26 cmt. a (1932)).FN1 
FN1. For the current version of this pre-
cept, see Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts § 27 cmt. b (1981). 
On facts similar to those of the instant case, the 
court in Doll concluded that it was "unwilling to al-
low a jury to infer an agreement to sign a lease 
when one of the parties specifically declared its in-
tention not to be bound until a lease was drafted 
and signed by both parties." 925 F.2d at 1370. The 
court explained that while enforcing a verbal agree-
ment may be justified where the evidence suggests 
that this was the intent of the parties, "when the 
parties make their intentions [not to be bound ab-
sent a formal executed agreement] clear, there is no 
basis for a court to step in and contradict their ex-
plicit desires." Id. See 1 Joseph M. Perillo, Corbin 
on Contracts § 2.9, at 149-50 (revised ed.1993). 
In this case, Equity repeatedly made clear its intent 
not to be bound until the parties had executed a 
formal writing containing all terms of a compre-
hensive agreement. Equity included language in let-
ters it sent Precision explaining this intention, and 
such language also appeared in various draft leases. 
In light of these facts, that the parties successfully 
negotiated and reached a tentative agreement on a 
number of the relevant terms does not justify ignor-
ing appellant's continuously expressed intent not to 
be bound other than by a finalized, signed lease. m2 
FN2. In Doll, the plaintiffs argued they had 
\nf)i 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
JL age- J u i J 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2001 WL 1297792 (Utah App.), 2001 UT App 313 
(Cite as: 2001 WL 1297792 (Utah App.)) 
Page 2 
reached an agreement with the defendant 
on all essential terms of a lease. See 925 
F.2d at 1368; Corbin § 2.9, at 150 n. 9. 
The Eleventh Circuit noted that the 
plaintiffs focus on the details agreed upon 
"ignored the primary question" and held 
that the defendant's intent not to be bound 
until a formal written agreement had been 
executed was clear and determinative. See 
925 F.2d at 1368-70. 
Further, even if Precision was free to ignore the ex-
pressed intent of Equity, the facts of this case 
simply do not indicate that a complete lease agree-
ment was ever reached, even orally. Precision con-
tends that an agreement was reached on April 18, 
1995, and fully memorialized in a final draft of the 
lease circulated on May 17, 1995. This argument is 
untenable given that the parties continued to reject 
and alter key terms of their still-evolving agreement 
after May 17 and until at least May 31, 1995.™3 
Confronted with these facts and Equity's continuous 
inclusion of language in the proposed lease agree-
ments and correspondence between the parties in-
dicating that Equity would not be bound until a 
formal lease was executed, we conclude that it was 
improper to enforce one of the many draft leases as 
though it were a binding contract. FN4 T he verdict 
and judgment are contrary to law, and they are ac-
cordingly reversed. 
FN3. This is a clear indication that neither 
party believed they had a binding final 
agreement. Not only did Precision acknow-
ledge that it understood a formal written 
agreement had to be executed, but it con-
tinued, as late as May 2, 1995, to propose 
changes to the April 18, 1995 draft lease, 
including a request for a $75,000 tenant 
construction allowance instead of a 
$70,000 allowance. Furthermore, on May 
22, 1995, Precision rejected and/or altered 
terms of the May 17 draft lease. Following 
this date, the parties were never able to 
come to an agreement on all terms. 
FN4. Even if a final oral agreement had 
been reached, the Statute of Frauds would 
likely render it unenforceable. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (1995). See also 4 
Caroline N. Brown, Corbin on Contracts § 
17.7, at 431-34 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., re-
vised ed. 1993). 
NORMAN H. JACKSON, Associate Presiding J., 
and WILLIAM A. THORNE, Jr., J , concur. 
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